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CARL L, BECKER.

A Pri ,LOSOPHJGAL ANAL i SlS

ln any study of American historiography, Car.l Becker emerges
as one of the more promin en t histori ca l philosophers,
Sabine suggesr:s that

inter~st

in he>cker us

from three main characteristics"

Ge orge H,

histot~i cal w~:iting

stems

l1rs r, far mort than most academic

historians, he was a literary artist, using a very fine pros e style
S~conJ,

which made en joyab le reading.
of the purposes which shoul

he had an unique understanding

guide an.l might set the standard of
~ h1rd,

exce llence in historical writing .,

Be cker had a broad and

keen intellectual cu r iosity , en li ghtenEd by wit and irony and united
with a deep moral conviction of the seriousness o( the historian's

calling and of the sign i f i cance oi hi st ory for a truly civilized
society,

1

Charlo t te Watkins Sm1th malntains that
fold place in American thought o

arl Becker has a fo ur-

£.Lrsr , he holds a very commanding

position among twentieth-c entury hi s torians.,

"Wh ether the object is

to praise the relativistic troond of Ameucan historiography (as it
was with Harry Elmer Barnes ln his

~~!H scorica l

Writ:l!!ll.) or

to deprecace it (as lt was wnh Mau r. Lee Mandelbaum in hi.s Problem of
Histor ica l

Knowle~),

subject,..

Second, Becker was one of the very few historians in his

Becker's name is prominent in any study of the

day accounted a wrirer, a man

1

Phil
Essays and
University

ot·

lerre rs , someone worth reading for

Writing of Histor~
New }ork : Cornell

2

pleasure.

Smith suggests that he is as much wor th studyi ng as some

of the nineteenth-century essayists who are read for their s t y l e.

Third, Becker is acce pted by pro f e ssiona l philosophers as bei ng one
among t hem.

Smith quotes Arthur E, Murphy who descr ibes Becker as

'"A critical historian who is also , though he would perhaps not admit
it, a philosopher , ' " Fourth , " although Be cker wa s a man of thought,
he had s uff i c i e nt imaginat ion and judgment to appreciate the action
and to allow for the compromises forced upon those who are making
history instea d of studying it. " 2
Ca rl Lotus Becker was born in Bl ackhawk County , Iowa , September 7,
1873 , to a substantia l, respected farm fam ily.

He had some firsthand

experience of frontier life and grew to love the agrarian atmosphere,

looking back on hi s boyhoo d with no stalgia.

Altho ugh Becker was a

quiet, introverted youth and sto li d in a ppearance, the appearance was

deceptiveo

Methodica l habit s , se lf - di sc ipline and s tron g common sense

characterized him a ll his li fe.
Becker's deep and abiding interest in history evo l ved while
e nrolle d in a course taught by Fredrick Jacks on Turner at the Unive rsity
of Wi sconsin in 1894, " ' Until then l had neve r been i nte r este d in
history , since the n, I have never ceased to be so,H 1 Becker wrote to

Tur ner in 1910 ,

3

After I know no t how long it dawned on me, and with what a
joyous sense of emanc ipation , that Turner wasn't, that no university professor need be, merely a teacher

I got a new i dea of hi story,

o

In this happy way

It was after all no convention

2
c harlo tte Watkins Smith , Carl Becker : On History and the Climate
of Op i nion (Ithaca, New York : Corne ll Unive r si t y Press , 1956), p. vi.
3
c ar l Becker ' s le rt e r to Fr edrick J ackson Turner , May 15, 1910,
quoted in Smith , .:C;,:a:..:r;.;·1:.....:3:..:e:..:c:.:k;:;e::.;r:..:.__O:;;n:.:....;H='.:.s.:.ro.:.:..ry._.::
a;:.;n.::d-=tcch.::e-=Cc..:l:.::i"'m:.:a'-'t:.:e"-'o:..:f"-'O'"'p"1"'.n"'i""o""n:.:,

p.

6.

3

agreed upon by rote , but just the infin1tely varied action and
thought of man who in past times had lived and struggled and died
for mean or great objects. lt was in short an aspect of life
itself, and as such somet hing to be proberl into, thought about,
written about.4
Having made such a profound d i scovery , Becke r delve.d into the study
of historiography with all th

Le r.vor of his frontier upbringing,

Car l Becke r 's historical philosophy is a product of his age,
He grew to manhood in a frontier farming area where a man was ap-

preciated for his current contributions as opposed to his background.
A frontiersman's character was judged by how hard he worked as well
as his

attitud ~

unimportant "

toward hi s neighbors o

A man's past seemed relatively

Beckeris intel':'pretation of history tvas comparable to

this philosophy of man,

A hi st rical fact was a de tail or idea in

the mind of an individual which had been placed there because of a
present need and not just because it to.'as an event of the past .,

In a l etter

to

Wi lliam Eo Dodd , who was a good friend and colleague ,

Becker explained his reasoning as to the importance of history.

He said

there was a universal va lue in history and that all pe ople regardless of
their capacity need hi story :
"It is simply the need of a conscious creat ure , who has memory
and who can anticipate the future , to e nlarge his present

perce ptions by remembering things that happe ned in the past ,
The i ndiv id ual does this constantly, primitive pe ople do it
more or less unconscious ly, and tviLhout much attention to
accuracyo
ritica l history is simply the instinctive and
necessa ry exercise. of me mory, but of memory tested and forti-

fied by reliable sources.

The facrs may be determined with

accuracy, but che 'inlerpreta t ion' will always be shaped by
the prejudices, biases, needs of the individual • ~ • history
has to be rewr i t te n by each generation. "5

4carl L. Becker , Everyman H1s Own Historian (New York :
Century -Crofts , ]nc o , 1935) , p, 196 - 199 o

Appleton-

5 car l Becker ' s l ecter to W1lliam E. Dodd , quoted in Smith,
Carl Becker: On History and_~ e Cli~~QEinion, p. 85.

4
To read the works o [ Becker and to understand his philosophy,
on e must give up the trad itiona l belief that history is eve rything
that has happe ned as we ll as the events which have been r ec orded ,
Becker , in h is arcicle entitled , "What Are Historical Facts," refers

to history as rh e memory of thin gs said and done. 6

In the book,

Everyman His Own Historian, Bec ke r does ad mit that there are two
histories :

" the actual series of eve nts that once occurred; and the

ideal series that we 'affirm and hold in memory."'

He states that

it is the histor ia n's aim to make the corres po ndence as exact as

possible; but being forced to identify history with the knowl edge
of history , we must concern ourselves with history as we know it to

Becker points out chat hi story as it actually happened is
absolute and unchange d, whe reas the events we hold in our memory
are "re lative" and always are changing because of a refinement in

our knowledge,

This is a norma l reaction in life, for as we gain

a dditional knowl e dg e , we make new judgme nts,

When we make new judgments ,

our conce pts and opinions take on new mea ning a lthough the facts stil l

r emain a bsolute ,

Becker defined history , for all practical purposes,

as the "memory of things said an d don e."

I n putting history into its

simplest tenns Becker admitted that each person, Mro Everyman, knows

some history .

lt may not be a political history or English history,

it could be personal history , but ne verthe less it is history.

only

pre r e quisite to be ing a historian i s to have a memory,

The

The

nmemory of a nything said or done " is h iscory.

6
Hans Meyerhoff , ed o , ~Los££.12Lof History in Our Time
(Garden icy , New York: Doub l tday and Compa ny , Inc,, 1959) , p, 122.
7
Becke r, Everyman His Own Historian , p. 234.

5

Becker admits to having two histories, but Burleigh T. Wilkins ,
in his biography of Becker, tries to point out that he actually has
four histories:
(1) History as it happe ned; (2) history as it is remembered by
Mr. Everyman; (3) history as it reflects the historians effort s
to improve upon Mr. Everyman's memory; and (4) history as it
ultimately proves to be useful and acceptable because and on l y
because Mr. Everyman likes the way in which the historian keeps
his account~ [or hin1.8

Wilkins said history ought to be useful,

It should enable us to

understand ourselves as we ll as to understand others and to he lp us
anticipate the direction of the social currents,

With this description

of the purpose of history he is in agreemen t with Becker's theory as
expressed to Dodd,
Although Becker was not a logic ian , his ideas did not violate
the principles of logic as exp ress ed in the f ollowing summary of his
ideas of history :
1.

All men , prim it ive and civilized alike, want to know their

2.

Certain things have been said and done in the past which

past.,

3.

4.

5.

ha ve l eft traces in men's memories and in written records.
Some past events can be imaginatively re-created by interpreting those traces~
The exte nt to which the re-creation resembles the actual
past event is something we cannot know , but it tvill depend

upon (a) the quantit.y and quality of the records used , and
(b) the quality of the imagination that does the re-creating.
Therefore, any re-creation of the past is only relatively
true. 9

Because of hi s approach to history, some professional historians
thought Becker committed h eresy against the profession.

Becker

8Burleigh Tay lor Wilkins , Carl Becker (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
M,I,T, Press and Harvard University Press , 1961), p. 205,
9

smith , Car l Becker :

On H1story and the Climate of Opinion, p. 107.

6

possibly a li e nated other historians by referring to history as a
myth.

Speaking of the professional historian he claimed, "We a re

thus of that ancient and honorable company of wis e men of the tribe,
of bards and story t e llers a nd minstrels, of soothsayers and pri es ts,
to whom in success ive ages has been entrus ted the keeping of the
useful myths."

Becker defi ned a myth as a "onc e valid but now dis-

carded version of the human story, as our now valid versions will

in due course be relegated to the category of discarded myths,"lO
Webster ' s dictionary defines a myth as a traditi ona l story ,
serving to explain some phenomenon, custom or any fictitious story.
Had Becker used the t erm "historica l nove l" instead of myth, he
probab l y would have received less criticism on this point.

To use

this terminology and explain it as free paraphrasing of one 's ow n
interpretation con c erning what happened wo uld put over the same

thought in a more subtle manner,

The obligation of th e professional

historian then is not to create, but "to preserve and pe rpetuate the
socia l traditions; to harmonize, as we ll as ignorance a nd prejudice
permit, the actua l and remembered series of events

o

••

to the e nd

that society may judge of what it is doing in the light of wha t it
has done a nd wha t i t hopes t o do," 11
To quo te Charlotte Wilki ns Smith, "Moonshine or philosophy- history or myth--what does it matter if it helps men to find ' enduring
values

1

amid 'perishing occasions 1 ? 1112

10
BecRe r, Eve ryman Hi s Own Historian, p. 247.
11

Ibid , • p. 248.

12Smith , Ca rl Becker:
p . 212.

On History and the Climate of Opinion,

Becker d1d not expect any historian to write a complete history
of the past.

Ihis second impossibility due to the lack of facts as

well as the personal biasses of the historian.

He believed one should

bring to light, as unbiased as possible, the most interesting and
important facts ,

Becker believed if the historian was interested in

the subjecl, he cou l d make it interesting for the reader,

Becker

made the following remark about the writing of history :
I he an of wr iting, the written record which, by providing man
with a transperso nal memory, wi ll disclose to his view, for

discrimination and appraisal , the mythical a nd the historic
past, the fami liar and the alien customi the world as experienced and the wor l d ideally conceived. 3
Carl Be cker did not advocate discarding the ideal of objectivity
in writing for the sole purpose of influencing the future and he
insisted that
No man can discard a ll his beliefs, prejudices a nd interests and

so make objective judgments even about facts, Some of hi s beliefs
are an essentia l part of the mind with which he judges, Therefore,
let us not foo l ourselves; let us not postpone making the best

judgments we can until this impossible goa l of objectivity has
be en r eached, Let us write history that wi ll be of use to the
present g e neration, history which may influence what we do in

the future because it helps us to understand what we have done
in the past, 14
Be cker was an historicist in that he tried to proj ect himself
11

unde r th e skin 11 of the individuals about whom he was writing.

If

he did not fee l he had enough empathy for the person, he did not
write about him.

When he read about someone and that pe rson came

alive in his mind, his pen recorded t he unspoken desires and the

inner ideas about the person.

Becker tried to r e-create a character

of fle sh and blood as he wrote his histo rica l ana lysis of the past

13

a rl L, Becker , Progress and Power (Stanford, California:
Stanford Uni versity Press, 1936), p, 37,
14sm i th ,
p, 112,

a r l Becker:

On History a nd the Cl i mate of Opinion,

8

events,

An example of his sympathetic understanding is found. in

the notes Bec ker made while studying the Earl of Hardwicke.

After

reading quantities of papers of the eighteenth- century jurist,
Becker confessed that the man was i mpossible to understand and thus
concluded his study of him . lS
I n .r .eading and studying the works of and about Carl Becker, one
deve lop s the fee ling that he was a humanitarian.
he lping and improving of mankind.

He stressed the

He indicated that a historical fact ,

if it can be usef ul to mankind, is true as it is re-created in the
m nd of the individual who is about to use it.

Becker realized that

the greatness of the past came from the intelligence , integrity, a nd
good wi ll of man.

Accordingly, George H. Sabine reported of Becker:

"for him the test of a civilized society was the degree in which law
and public authority rest on free discussion and vo luntary consent,

and he va lued democracy becaus e , with all its faults, it still offered

..

the widest scope f or intelligence and good will. nl6
Bec ker live d in a world of ide as and found interest in them as

wel l a s th e human beings who created them.

Becker believe d new ideas

were only ol d ideas put into a new perspective.

He played freely with

facts and i dea s, trying to put old ideas into a new light .

This is

on e r eas on why the same ideas emerge often in Becker's writings.

Becke r's statements of historical relativism were among the first
to b e made in the United States a nd indicated his early dedication to

the ideas o f

11

present relativism.

11

He concerned himself with facts

15
car l Becker's Notes, Drawe r 10, quoted in Smith, Carl Becker:
On History and the Climate of Opinion, p, 129-130.
16 snyder , De ra.chment a nd t he Writing of History:
Letters ot

arl 'L ., Becker, p., xii.,

Essays and

9

as t hey r ela te d co the present need and demand of his society.
Becker's se lection of the facts depended on present demands which
might not nece ssarily have concerned the event,
Becker d id not d iscard all absolute concepts,

Although a relativist,
Even though he left

his re ligio us attitude and background behind him during the early
years of his career, one finds traces of the absolute in some of

his writings.

He believed some principles endured through all ages ,

and he did ever ything in his power to preserve them.

These values

were symbo lized by the words of "liberty," "equality," "fraternity, 11
"hLDnanity , 11 ''to l eration," and "reason ., "
Becke r re cognized the need for a continuous study of history to

help the stude nt relate the past to the present needs of society.

He

sa id one could not gain the full benef it from historical research
unle ss that person d id the research himself .

We can capitalize on

research done by the scientists; for example,we could use the discovery

of the e l ec tric light since our entire society can benefit from the
research o[ Edison and the other men in their perfection of this great

gift to mankind.

But in the field of historical research, we benefit

much l ess it we use the research of others.

When writing history,

the Eacrs , accord ing to Becker, cannot be used until the historian
can

re ~ c reate

the image in his own mind, and without the background

one gains from personal research, it is extremely difficult to recre ate t hat image :
''ror if reason is a functional instrument , then it must have
a f unction, and what function can it have if it be not to

d iscriminate the relatively true f rom the relatively false,
the de pe ndable fact from the deceptive illusion, in order that
th~ orga nism may pur sue the better rather than the less good
inr e re st? 11 17

17 smith , Carl Becker :

On History and the Climate of Opinion , p. 101.

10
"Be ck e r's re lativism is a mode st philosophy akin to Justice

Holme s

1

conce ption of truth as

1

t.he s ystem of my limitations, ,,lB

J us t a s the J udge limite d his concept of truth , the historian also
lim1r. s h i s conclusion to his knowledge of the subject material, his
re sour ce s , his environmen t , his moral judgments, as well as his prejudi ces and biasses.

By "relativism" Becke.r meant that new histories

r e place the old, that what is included or stressed in the new histories
de pends in part upon the social situation of the historian,
"I f r e lativism means more than this--if it means that a considera ble body of knowledge, an incre asing body of knowledge, is not
obj e ctive ly ascertainable , i f it means a denial that the idea l ·
of obj e ctive historical knowle dge is possible of at least partial
a ttainme nt - -then I am not a relativist. 111 9
Becker , as most , believed in many things simply because he cou ld not

h e lp be lieving in them.
e vide nce he declared :

In an unpublished article on historical
"'In this sens e history is, as Charles Beard

says, "an ac t of faitho"

But the n no more so than all experience. 111 20

Be cker ' s theory of pragmatism introduced another source of
conte ntion be tween himself and othe r historians.

The question involved

truths that are true and truths that become true simp l y because they
are us ef ul .

After reading Be cker's wr i tings , one may question his

e thics in r e gard to truth,
he rit ag e cree ping out .

Once again it appears to be his f r ont i er

A narrative is not necessarily true eve n if

it doe s fit the situation, according to Burleigh T. Wilkins, who
disagree d with Becker on this point.
18

Ibid. , P• 120 .

19c a rl Becker's review of Maurice Mandelbaum's, The Problems of
His t ori cal Knowledge, Philosophical Review, XLIX (April, 1940), p. 363 ,
quot e d in Wi lkins , Carl Be cker, p. 207,
20

P• 120.

smit h, Ca rl Becke r :

On His t o r y an d the Climate of Opinion ,

11

What Becker accomplished in his comme nts on historical facts and
evidence amounted to the rejection of th e correspondence theory
of truth in historical inquiry. More accurate l y , he had set up
a new correspondence theory in which the old ideal of a correspondence between the report and the reported is of necessity sur·

rendered to a correspondence between the reporter (the hi storia n)
and what his reader (Mr, Everyman) regards as usef uL If useful
and necessary rhen , true , becker had said this in 1910 in his
essay , "Detachment and the Wr11fng of History"; and t h is he
simply r epeated in the 1930 's,
BeckE::r 1 s philosophy of h story moved him in the direction of

religious skepticism, and in turn towar s skepticism concerning all

claims to absolute certainty, whether made by c l ergymen , philosophers,
or historians.

While attending the Unive rsity of Wisconsin, he penned

a "W1l d Thoughts Notebook" which revealed his retreat from the "comfo rt
of cerrainty" 1n things re l igious"

However , Becker's skepticism

alternated with faith , but whate,er faith he felt was of a secu l ar
nature while h is skepticism was aimed at all theories of knowledge
that permit judgment of probable relationships of facts or judgme nts
about values to masquerade as abso l utes o

Burleigh I, Wi lkins states that this inabi lit y of Becker's to
find the hand of God in history would occasiona ll y get him into
difficulties with readers who supposed they could detect a note of
irrelig1ouslty in his writings,
b~c ker

wou l d , however, a l most never strike an arrogant or dogmat ic

note in his disbelief in the supernatural , which may have offe nde d
the dogmatic believer even more. He simp ly affirmed that he was
una\vare of any divine plan for human beings and voiced the suspicion that 5he univ erse was indifferent to mankind, including
Carl becker, 2
In answering t he charges concerning his ske pticism, Becker may

have made the fo llowing statement :
21

22

w1lklns,

ar l Becker , Po 205,

Jb1d o , Po 21 - 23 ,

12
f ve nt ur e to sa y that our knowle dge of historical facts , as
we ll a s the infe r e n ces drawn t r om the faces , is relative and
not absolute • •• 1[ t h is l e a ds t o absolute skepticism , then
all
can say i s tha t a bs ol u t e s ke pticism is what it leads to. 23

Conce rning hif t orica l

s ubj ~c t s ,

~ ~c k e r

J eve lope d a concept based

on the i Je a that thert was no s ioglt fact , that every fact was a compound
of other fa c t s,

: o un dt r star i >'hy

whaL maUe the (act s r hat ma dt' the

s om~ thing
t:'Ve n t

happened, one had to know

oc c ur,

Jf the fact was unknown

and could not be creat e d as an tmage in the mind, then it could not be
considered a f act ,

"' I he fa c t s of history do not exist for any historian

until h e cre atts the m, an

int o eve r y f act that he creates some part of

his individual expe rie nc e must t nt t: r , '" 24
Be caus e
r e lative an

Bec k ~ r b e li ~v~d

tha t knowle dge oE historical facts was

not ab s olut e , he con c lud ed that a scientific formula

for histori cal s ynthes is was nc ith r po ss ible nor necessary.
"Comph·t e cte r.a chme n t would p re duct':' f e w histories, and none worthwhile ; or the r e ally deta c hed m1n d is a de ad mind, lying among
the fact s of history like unmagne ti z d steel among iron filings ,
no synthe sis e ve r r sultin g , in on e case or the other, to the
end of time .. "2 'i
'The m1nd will se l e cr an d d i sc rimtn a r e from the very beginning.
lt 1s the whole "apper ce- i v ing mas s" lhat does the business,
s e izing upon thi s or th a t nt w impress ion and building it into
it s own growing con t~ nt o As n ~w fa crs ar e taken in, the o ld
idea s or c once pt s , it 1s [rue are modi f ied, distinguished ,
destroye d e ve n; but th e modifie i de as be come new centers of
attraction o And so t.he proce s .s is continued , for years it may
be o The f:inal synthe si s is oubtle ss composed of facts unique,
casually connected, r~ve aling unique change; but t he unique fact,
select e d be cause of its ~mportanc e , was in every case selected
23 arl L o Becker , " Commentary on Mandelbaum ," MS Becker papers,
quoted in Smith , Car l B cker : On Hi s tory and t he Climate of Opinion ,
p. 43 ,
24
snyder , J~ tachment an d the Writing of History :
Lette r!! of Ca r 1 Lo Bec ker , p, 12,

Essays and

l3

because of its importance for some idea a lready in possession
of the field. f he original concepts , which give character to
the e ntire synthesis, were contribut e d, not by the facts of
the s ixtoee nth -ce n t ury, bur by the facts of the twentieth-century. u26

Becker

~s tablished

th e goal an d obligation of the historian to

discov er and bring forth the f a cts of history o

He admits that all the

facts are not known to mankind, bu t the job of the historian is to
gather as many of the faces as he can in order to re -c reate an event

as accurately as po ssib l e.
Becker asks t hree questions :
(2)

I n hi s ana l ysis of historical material,
What is the historical fact?

(1)

Whe r e is the historical fact?
I n regar

(3)

When i s the historica l fact?

to the first quest ion, Ee cker 1 s aim is to prove the

point tha t there are no single f ac e •
simple fact , ''Caesar eros se d th

He uses what appears to be a

RubJ.c ona"

To a student of history

this Eact ha s meaning becaus e of the o t her facts concerning the great
decision Caesar' had to make at t he rive r bank to march against the

Roman Repub li c , which have alrea dy been instilled in his mind.

More

meaning comes to the individual when he unde rstands that the Rubicon
is a rive r se parating the province of Gaul from Italya
Caesa r was in

~au l

To know why

and to understand the orde rs he received from Rome

will give the re ade r a dd itional insight to the "s imple fact."

Without

an understanJ ing of other consiJ ra t. ions, t he stateme nt, "Caesar
crossed the Rubicon ," has no meaning o

''lhus a s i mple fact turns out to be not a simp l e fact at all.
It is the statement that is simv l e--a simple generalization of
a thousand and one facts o o a which we do not for the moment
care to us e , and this ge ne ralization itself we cannot use apa~t
from the wider facts and generalizations which it symbolizes."27

26
27

Ibid. , p. 25.
Meyerholf, The

Ph~losophy of History in Oa r Time , p. 122 .

14
Becker goes on to say that the historian deals not so much with
the event but with a statement concerning the eve nt.
''When we really get down to hard facts , what the historian is

always dea ling with is an affirmation -- an affirmation of the
fact that something is true •• , For all practica l purposes
it is this affirmation about the event that constitutes for us

the historical fact. ,28
Where is the historical fact?
of the historian.

Becker insists it is in the mind

If an image of the fact cannot be created in the

mind of the historian, even though the event occurred , it is of no
value to him, and the facts do not exist for him .

"'The facts of

history do not ex i st for any historian until he creates them, and
into every fact that he creates some part of his individual experience
must enter., 11129

In order to agree with Becker's answer to the third question ,
one must accept his first two answers that historical facts are the
re-creation of affirmed events in the mind of the historian.

The

answer to the third question is that the historical event exists at
the time it is used by the historian.

Becker uses "when is" and

not "when was " a historical fact to exemp lify that the facts are still
To say "when was 11 would infer the fact no longer exists or

alive.

that it is a "dead facto"

In studying this concept of historical fact a student must ask
himself:

Do I knm; all the true and useful facts?

know all the truth about the past?

it fa ls e?

Does our socie t y

lf we do not know something, is

By a complete analysis of these questions a student of

Becker can more easily gras p his philosophy of "relativism. "

28

~o,

29

He

Po 124,

snyder, Detachment and th~ Writ1ng of History:
Letters of Carl l, Becker, P• 48,
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did not profess that our soc i ety knows a ll the facts f rom the past;
hm....,eve r, he did say we know many more than we are using.

those facts we need to prove th
is demanding be prove n.

We us e

concepts which our presen t day society

The only time a good judgment can be made is

when one knows a nd understands what he is judging.

If we can not

conceive of somet hing, how t hen can we make a judgment concerning
its being true or false.

The facts we can envision in our minds and

a r e re l at ive to our co nce pts a r e our "true and useful'' facts o

When

our soc i ety wan ts new interpretations, we will then use other facts
and perhaps f ind new on es in writing our history and making our

judgments of t he past .
The va l id ity o£ this philo so phy may be challenged.
be given only the history they want to hea r?

One wou ld probably have

to say that perhaps to do so would be mora lly wrong.
answer would be yes.

Should people

The practical

If we hope to benefit from past experiences ,

we need to study the experie nces from which we can learn.

It is true

that history wi ll not repeat i tse l f , but by gaining knowle dge from
past experiences whi ch are not unique to our

11

cl i mate of opinion,"

we can be more aware of some of our present-day problems and be better

prepared to mee t themo

Becker states t hat we cannot predict the future,

b ut we can anticipate i t by st udyin g the. s imilarities of events.

Regar ing the assembling of facts , Be cker said that the selection
of which fac ts to use was th e hi stor ian's most pressing problem.

'"1he hi sto ria n does indeed have a concept of the end , and he selects

the facts that wi ll exp la in how th at e nd came about.

But it is the

concept that determines the fact , not the facts the concept. ,, J O
JQlbid o , Po 24,
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It is pos s>b le , then , that we could know the outcome of a histor y
book before we read it, and s urely the author knew the outcome

befor e he sta rted writing.
but he knew the outcome.

Perhaps he did no t know t he de t a il s ,
Wi t h this concept in mind , it wo uld seem

that the historian selects hi s facts to substa ntiate his concept.
There are two f orces contributing to t he selection of facts to
be us e d.

A quote from Becker ca n best illustrate this point:

"Ou r imagined picture of the actual eve nt is always dete rmine d

by two things : (1) by the actua l event its e lf insofar as we
can know someth i ng about it; and (2) b y our present purposes,
desires , pre- possessions, and pre judices , all of which e nte r
into the process of knowing it. The act ual event contributes

somethi ng to the imagine d picture; but the mind tha t holds
the imagined picture a lways contributes something , too. u31

What determines t he images create d in one's mind?
images based on present conditions or past even ts?
to think of a

Are thes e

One nee ds only

his to rica l fac t in ord e r to a nswe r this question.

For examp l e , think of Martin Luth e r standing before the Diet of Worms.
Without an h istorica l backbround and understanding of the word , "die t,"
one wou l d envision an en tir e l y dif fe re nt image.

When on e thinks of

a "diet" as bei ng a German court of assembly , he wi ll create a truer

image of Lu ther be ing judge d by the princes of Germany .

This fact

is brought to li fe , at l e ast in our minds , by our knowl edge of past
e vents wir.h an understa nding of hi storica l vocabulary.
Create a n image of anoth e r fact suc h as
his daily f ood ..

pre historic man pr e paring

Upon whjch .facts ca n we base our assumptions.

we know what hi s die t was and how he prepared it?
he ate a nd how ofte n?

Do we know how much

In order to create the image of

man, it i s necessary to call on our present desires ,
31

Ibid , , Po 58,

Do

prehistoric
prepossessions
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and biasses .

Assuming these poin ts, one would have to agree tha t

images are the product of individual know l e dge as well as o ne 1 s
purposes, desires , and

prej udic es~

Although Bur l e i gh T, Wilkins disag r eed with Becker's philosophy,
the last paragraph in his book,

~Becker ,

and held him i n high esteem as a

hi storian.

is proof that he admired
He points out that Be cker

was not an original thinker in a ny striking way, but an elegant one who

used honest r easoning to gain his ideas.

He does not hestitate to

admit that Becker wi ll stand amo ng the better essayists of the time,
and as one of t he most accomplished wri t ers o f nonfiction in America.
He was more v irtuous than vital, more philosophical th an prophetic,
but understanding is not always an inferior form of activity .
He wi ll e ndure for many years as a somewhat paradoxical example
of hi s own Jeffersonia n verity "th at in the long run all values ,

both for the individual and for soc i ety , are inseparable from the
love of truth, and from the disinterested search for it. n32
In Becker ' s own words one fi nds a se l f-eva luation :
"I am one of those who are more i nte r es t e d in finding out so far

as possible what men are li ke and how they think than in 'doing
them good , 1 wh ich I rationalize by saying that the way I can
do them the most good is to find out what they are like, what
they do , and why they t hink it' s a goo d thing to do . " 33
George Sabine said the fol l owing a bout Car l Becker in the introduction to the book, Detachment and the Writing of History :
In truth it LBecke r 's philosoph~/ united two posi tions that are
l ogic a l ly independent i f not incohere nt . His emphasis on what
he ca lle d "rela t ivism" seems to imply the dissolution of "abso lute "

ends or va lues which might def ine the direction of social progress,
and repeate dly he used language which suggested that this was indeed
his mean ing.

Yet his profoundest moral convictions were a ll on

the side of a be lief that some ideals--specifica lly those embodied
3

~ilkins ,

Car l Becker , p. 229 .

ca.tl Betker ' ~ letter to Thomas _Ree d Powe ll, December 3, 1944 ,
quot e d in Smith , Car l Becker: On Hist ory an d the Climate of Opinion,
p. 39 .
33
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in the democratic liberties-·were in substance unchangeable
and we r e indispensable, at least in a civilized human society.34

In a f inal analysis of Carl Becker's historical philosophy, one
would ha ve to agree that there is considerable merit in it.

It seems

t o be more r e asonable than a scientific theory because no one can hope

to know e.xactly what happened hundreds of years ago.

Men cannot agree

on what happened yesterday, hence an exact scientific theory would be

of little value.

The scientific method can be trusted in the scientific

fields, but it cannot be trusted when human beings are involved.

We

cannot t e ll the reactions of the English people in 1215 because we cannot
t e ll our own re actions at any given time.

A philosophy oriented to religion would not be acceptable because
th e r e are so many different ideas to consider.

One could probably

ne ve r deve lop an universal historical philosophy based on religion
which would be accepted by all cultures.
Be cke r's philosophy comes as close as possible to an universally
a cce pte d doctrine.
pre se nt nee ds.

The people of the world can relate history to their

They can orient it to their culture and background.

Be cke r's relativist theory gives the history student a motive

with which to study.

One must have a goal in order to achieve from

his study just as the historian had a goal in writing the history.
That which is relative to his life and environment determines his goal.
In summing up his thoughts about Becker, Burleigh T. Wilkins says
tha t a man does not attain immortality during his own lifetime, and

it se emed unlikely that Becker would ever achieve such a high estate
34
sn yde r, Detachment and the Writing of History:
Lette rs of a r l Lo Becker, p 9 xiv o
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in the e yes of posterity,

However, it is apparent that he will long

remain a significant figure for students in American culture.

"As a

t hinker he is, therefore, significant not for the conclusions he arrived
at , but f or the journey he made."

Mr., Wilkins maintains that Becker

was "both a weathervane and a countervailing force, a man of paradox
torn between skepticism and faith, between pragmatism and a belief in
the intrinsic worth of certain principles and modes of life."
One might disagree with Becker on innumerable points, which
would not have offended him, and yet find him one of the most
att r active if minor figures of our age, In the field of history,
Becker's humane be liefs were reflected in his efforts to prevent
the de-humanization of history, which might some day rank among
our gravest e rrors.35
Car l Becker was more interested during his last few years in
hi story " regarde d as the sense of the past" and how it could enrich
and expand ma n 's life .

He felt that since man is the only creature

that has a memory, he should use it f or the purpose of en lar ging the
present and making it glorious.
How has man made his li fe glorious in past times? The springs
of illusion and aspiration have nourished every product of man's
intelligence. These are the sources of human pmver that Be cker
sought in individuals and na tions and e pochs. 30

5

36

Wi lk ins , Carl Becker, P• 225 - 229.

smith , Car l Becker :
p. 210-211.

On History and the Climate of Opinion,
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